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Abstract
Relationship between corporate governance and 
company performance is an important topic in Ac-
counting. Performance of an economic company de-
pends on different factors. One of them is corporate 
governance which has a greet effect on performance. 
Our purpose is to study the relationship between 
corporate governance and accounting measures of 
performance of the accepted companies in Tehran 
stock exchange. In our study corporate governance 
is an independent variable and accounting measure 
of performance is a dependant variable. Considering 
limited samples, 109 companies accepted in Tehran 
Stock Exchange have been reviewed since 2006 to 
2010 accounting to the ranking of the data. To test 
the hypothesis we have used the Spearman correla-
tion coefficient for measurement of the impact of 
controlled variables on the relationship of indepen-
dent chi-square test. Findings show that there is no 
meaningful relationship between percentage of in-
dependent directors of board and company perfor-
mance while company performance has a meaning-
ful relationship with institutional investors.
Keywords: Company performance, Corporate 
governance, Institutional investors, Percentage of 
independent directors of board
Introduction
Tension between rights of individual and orga-
nizations is one of the basic problems of our so-
ciety. Nowadays financial markets and powerful 
stock companies grow greatly. Beside this growth, 
there should be legal tools till the companies can 
be responsible. The topic of company governance 
has been designed in this frame work. Corporate 
governance is a reaction to agency which rises 
from separation of ownership from management. 
Separation of ownership from management makes 
managers take decisions for the sake of their inter-
ests and against to interests of shareholders (Jensen 
& Meekling, 1976).
Indeed Corporate governance system  is a set of 
rule, regulations, institute and policies that through 
different mechanisms determine how and for the 
benefit of whom companies manage. The purpose 
of Corporate governance is to be assured from exis-
tence of a framework that provides a good balance 
between manager’s independence, accountability 
and benefits of shareholders (Hssas Yegane & Bag-
homiyan, 2005).
Institutional investor
Theoretically, the place of institutional inves-
tors in corporate governance is complicated. From 
this point of view, Institutional investors have strong 
corporate governance mechanisms which can be 
opened to view the company’s management to 
monitor. They can also have considerable influence 
on company management and their interests are 
aligned with shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Usually, institutional investors have power on 
company shares and become they are expert in in-
vestment, they have high ability to control compa-
nies (Velury, 2006). Del Guercio and D. Hawkins 
(1999) showed that supervised companies can limit 
and control managers behaviors. Supervision of in-
stitutional investors can encourage managers to pay 
more attention to company performance and have a 
little opportunism behaviors.
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Percentage of independent directors of board
The board of managers is the higher source of 
making decision in all small and big companies, that 
their decision does not affect the invest and wealth of 
the company. The board can elect or remove higher 
executive manager of organization. These managers 
do not conspire with executive manager because of 
their benefits since independent managers are gen-
erally executive managers in other companies they 
have a great motive to be famous. Because  the mo-
tive of executive managers for using the wealth of 
owners for their benefits is not in a same direction 
with motive of independent managers to the famous, 
it improves the supervision on management and fi-
nally improves the performance of the company and 
decreases the cost of agencies (Fama, 1983), that is 
found as proportion of independent managers in the 
board to the total members of company board at the 
end of the year.
Company performance
By separation ownership from management and 
providing conflict between benefits, lack of assess-
ment and control on company performance provide 
lack of better allocation of resources that makes 
some losses for shareholders and finally the econ-
omy losses. Defining and functionalizing company 
performance has been complicated and usually for 
doing it, different measures are used. In this study, 
for measuring company performance, we have used 
five indexes. They are rate of return on assets (Net 
profit divided by total assets), rate of return on equi-
ty (Net income divided by total equity), Ratio price 
to book value per share(P/B), Ratio price to earning 
per share(P/E) and Tobin’s Q ratio.
Review of Related Literature 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) in their research 
showed that existence of big institutional inves-
tors because of increasing effective supervision has 
a positive effect on performance and value of the 
company. Maug (1998)in his research, concluded 
that the use of institutional investors of their abil-
ity for supervising on management and company 
performance depends on rate of their investment. 
Whatever the rate of institutional ownership in-
creases, supervision on management improves, and 
it is a direct relationship.
Bushee’s findings (1998) showed that institu-
tional investors can improve the company perfor-
mance, He believe that it is because of limitations 
that institutional investors provide against manage-
ment motives. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) in 
their research found that there is a positive relation-
ship between institutional investors and rate of re-
turn  on equity. Of course, Duggal and Millar (1999) 
in the united state of America studied the relation-
ship between different kinds of institutional inves-
tors and  company performance but that didn’t find 
any relationship between institutional ownership 
and company performance.
Research by Colse and his colleagues (2003) 
showed that companies with more independent 
member in their board in Comparison to companies 
with more executive member in their board, have 
better performance. Also, Fama and Jensen (1983) 
found that the increase of independent member in-
creases the efficiency of controlling the decisions 
and by increasing supervision through decreasing the 
Agency Costs, company performance will increase.
Although researchers found that there are some 
concepts that they don’t have compatibility with 
Agency Theory. For example, Dalton and his col-
leagues by analyzing different research on perfor-
mance of the board concluded that the rate of pres-
ence of independent managers in the board has no 
direct effect on performance of trade unit. Klien 
(1998) showed that there is no relationship between 
the rate of presence of independent managers with 
the level of performance of trade unit, but he saw that 
if there is a internal professional committee as audit 
committee and financing committee, will improve 
the performance of trade unit. Dehaene and his 
colleagues (2002) studied the relationship between 
company performance and the combination of the 
board in Belgium, and he did notfind any meaning-
ful relationship. Fasberg(2005) also did not find any 
meaningful relationship between independent man-
agers and different measures of performance.
Namazi and Kermani (2008) studied the effect 
of owner structure on accepted companies in Teh-
ran stock exchange and found that there is a nega-
tive meaningful  relationship between company 
performance and institutional investors (Namazi 
& Kermani, 2008). Kordlar (2005) showed that 
increasing institutional investors decreases the 
lack of information matching between managers 
and stockholders, can have a better supervision on 
company performance and manager and decrease 
the conflict of benefits (Nourvash & Ebrahimi, 
2005). Finding of Nourvash and his colleagues 
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(2010) prove this issues, too. Rahman Seresht and 
Mazlumi (2005) found that institutional investors 
in stock companies decreases the agency costs and 
have a positive effect on their performance. Also 
the research by Hassas Yegane and his colleagues 
(2008) showed that the presence of institutional in-
vestors improves the company performance. Kord-
lar and his colleagues (2010) studied the effect of 
institutional ownership on the performance of ac-
cepted companies in Tehran stock Exchange and 
found that there is a positive meaningful relation-
ship between institutional ownership and company 
performance. Modarres and his colleagues (2009), 
in their research, about studying the effect of insti-
tutional  stockholders on return of stock holders, 
found that there isn’t any meaningful relationship 
between institutional investors and company per-
formance. Qalibaf Asl and Rezaie (2007), in their 
research about studying the effect of the combina-
tion of the board on the performance of the accept-
ed companies in Tehran stock Exchange found that 
there is no  meaningful relationship between the 
proportion of independent members of the board 
and company performance. Also, in a research by 
Hassas Yeganeh and his colleagues (2009) under 
the subject of studying relationship between qual-
ity of company governance and the performance, 
found no meaningful between independent man-
agers in the board and company performance.
Research hypothesis
Hypothesis One: There is a Significant Relation-
ship Between thepercentage of independent direc-
tors of board and company performance.
Hypothesis Two: There is a Significant Relation-
ship Between the institutional investors and com-
pany performance.
Methodology
Population and data collection method
In this research the population included all the 
accepted companies in Tehran stock Exchange in 
industry and in other groups. Data were gathered 
from 2006 to 2010from 109 companies based on fol-
lowing limitations:
Companies should be in Tehran stock Exchange 
from 2006 to 2010.
End of financial year of each company is March 20.
They should not have any losses in recent years.
They should not have any changes in the activi-
ties and financial period.
Their data should be accessible.
They should not be a financial company for ex-
ample banks or insurance company.
Gathering data was based on documents. We 
have used financial statements for doing this. we 
have used Tadbir software and website of Tehran 
stock Exchange.
Control variables
Size of company: As a measure for the size of 
company we have the sum of the assets  of company 
at the end of the year for studying and calculating 
relationship between control variables and inde-
pendent variables we have used Arithmetic mean of 
company in five years.
Financial leverage: it is by dividing total li-
ability at the end of the financial period to share-
holder’s equity in the same financial year, then for 
studying relationship between control variables 
and dependent and independent variables we 
have used Arithmetic mean of Financial leverage 
of five years.
Data analysis method
Based on the purpose of this study, our meth-
od is functional and quasi-experimental. Based on 
ranking data, we have used spearman correlation 
coefficient and for measuring the effect of control 
variables on relations, we have used Chi-squaretest 
ofindependence.Independent variables are Arith-
metic mean of variables in five years. After calculat-
ing variables, we have ranked the sample companies 
according to each variable. So, each sample has five 
ranks according to: return on assets(ROA), rate of 
return  on equity(ROE), Q Tobin ratio, Ratio price 
to book value per share(P/B) and Ratio price to 
earning per share(P/E). Then, for calculating per-
formance, index we used:
Performance (PER) = 
1
ROAranking  
+
 
1
�ROE ranking  
+
 
1
QTobin  
+
1
/P Branking   
+
 
1
/P Eranking          
(1)
For total functional ranking, we have ranked the 
numbers again. So, by using regression model and 
analyzing data by SPSS software 16th version we 
have analyzed our hypothesis.
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in which:
PER
it
: performance of company i in period t
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Outdir
it
: percentage of independent directors of 
board of company i in period t
NATinvest
it
: institutional investors of company i 
in period t
SIZE
it
: Size of company i in period t
LEV
it
: Financial leverage of company i in period t
ε
it
: Error term for company i in period t
Results and Discussion 
In correlation method, one of the assumption 
is that the distribution of variables in normal. For 
measuring the normality of variables, we have used 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test the results are shown in 
table 1 below:
variableSigResult
Institutional investors0/166Normal
Percentage of independent directors of board0/111Normal
Rate of return  on equity(ROE)0/327Normal
Return on assets(ROA)0/165Normal
Q Tobin ratio0/093Normal
Ratio price to earning per share(P/E)0/103Normal
Ratio price to book value per share(P/B)0/078Normal
Financial leverage0/089Normal
Size of company0/139Normal
Table(1). The results of normality tests
Hypothesis One: There is a meaningful relation-
ship between the presence of the independent direc-
tors in the board with company performance.
Performance is a dependant variable and ratio 
of independent directors in the board is independent 
variable. Hypothesis H
0
 is lack of correlation between 
dependent and independent variables and Hypothesis 
H
1 
mean there is a correlation between dependent and 
independent variables. Since the level of significance is 
(0/169) and it is bigger than accepted amount (0/05), 
we cannot reject H
0
. So there is no meaningful correla-
tion (%95) between independent directors in the board 
and company performance. So, the research showed 
that the role of independent directors do not match 
with agency theory. It means that it cannot remove the 
conflict between stockholders and directors. And, it is 
a weak supervisor tool in improving company perfor-
mance. These findings are coordinate with finding by 
Dehaene and his colleagues (2002), Fasberg (2005), 
Qalibaf Asl and Rezaei (2007), Hassan Yegane and his 
colleagues(2009) and are inconsistent with Fama and 
Jensen (1983) and Coles(2003).
Hypothesis Two: There is a meaningful relation-
ship between presence of institutional investors and 
improving company performance. Hypothesis H
0
 
means lack of correlation between the presence of in-
stitutional investors and company performance. Since 
the level of significance (0/039) is less than accepted 
level (%5), hypothesis H
0
cannot be accepted and hy-
pothesis H
1
is confirmed. Then, there is a correlation 
between the presence of institutional investors and 
company performance. These findings are coordinate 
with findings of Chaganti and Damanpour (1991), 
Maug (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bushee 
(1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Nourvash 
and colleagues (2010), Rahman Seresh and Mazlumi 
(2005), Kordlar and colleagues (2010), Yeganeh and 
colleagues (2008) and these findings are inconsistent 
with findings of Duggal and Millar (1999), Modarres 
and colleagues (2009), Namazi and Kermani (2008).
Table2. Summary of findings
HypothesisCoefficientSig.NStatistical results
Primary Hypothesis0/2364320/16992Rejecting hypothesis
Second Hypothesis0/3153890/03992accepting hypothesis
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For better explanation of the results, the re-
lationship of indices of performance variables, 
i.e., return on assets(ROA), rate of return on 
equity(ROE), Q Tobin ratio, Ratio price to book 
value per share(P/B) and Ratio price to earning per 
share(P/E) with dependent variables were tested 
separately. Results (unreported) showed that only 
the return on assets and the rate of return  on equity 
has a meaningful and direct relationship with the 
presence of institutional investors.
Further, by considering the size of company 
and financial leverage as control variables, relation-
ship between dependent and independent variables 
were studied. Sample companies have been divided 
to three groups, large, medium and small according 
to their sizes and according to financial leverage the 
have been divided to three groups, high, medium 
and low, too. Indices of dependent and independent 
variables were divided to different groups. According 
to functional index, they were divided to big, medi-
um and small and according to ratio of independent 
members to total members of the board ad the pres-
ence of institutional investors, they were divided to 
two groups: more than 50 percent and lesser than 
50 percent. Then, we composed two tables for func-
tional variables and dependant variables. And, by 
using chi-square test the independent of indepen-
dent variables and dependent variable were tested 
based on the size of company and financial leverage. 
Results showed that hypothesis H
0
 is not accepted 
only for the relationship between performance with 
ratio of independent members in the board to total 
members with the coefficient of 0/037 in medium 
companies.
Conclusions 
The results of Primary hypothesis showed that 
there is no meaningful relationship between inde-
pendent directors in the board as one of internal 
mechanism of company governance with company 
performance. Since one of the possible reasons for 
above results is a limited corporation of independent 
members in the board in company activities and low 
supervision on company performance, independent 
members should try to know better about their dies, 
place and role that they will do their Job effectively.
The results of the Second hypothesis showed 
that there is a positive and meaningful  relationship 
between institutional investors as a external mech-
anism of company governance and performance 
indexes. Therefore, we can conclude that these in-
vestors are a good motive for improving company 
performance.
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